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La convergence vers l’équilibre de Nash dans l’oligopole de Cournot est un 
problème qui apparaît de manière récurrente dans les études économiques. Le 
développement des jeux évolutionnaires a permis l’utilisation d’un concept 
d’équilibre en adéquation avec les dynamiques d’ajustement et la stabilité 
évolutionnaire de l’équilibre de Cournot a été étudiée par plusieurs articles. Ces 
articles montrent que l’équilibre Walrasien est la seule solution 
évolutionnairement stable du jeu de Cournot. Vriend(2000) propose l’utilisation 
des algorithmes génétiques pour l’étude des dynamiques d’apprentissage et il 
obtient la convergence vers la solution de Cournot avec l’apprentissage 
individuel. Nous montrons dans cet article pourquoi l’apprentissage social 
conduit à la solution de Walras et comment l’apprentissage individuel peut 
effectivement permettre la convergence vers la solution de Cournot. De plus, ces 
résultats sont obtenus dans un cadre plus général avec une application à l’aide 
d’expériences informatiques. 
Mots-clés :  Oligopole de Cournot  ; Apprentissage ;  Evolution ;  Sélection ; 
Stabilité évolutionnaire ; Equilibre de Nash ; Algorithmes génétiques 
 





Convergence to Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly is a problem that recurrently 
arises as a subject of study in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory 
has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics 
and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been studied by 
several articles. Several articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable 
evolutionary solution of the Cournot game. Vriend (2000) proposes to use genetic 
algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to 
Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. We show in this article how social 
learning gives rise to Walras equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual 
learning can effectively yield convergence to Cournot instead of Walras equilibrium. We 
illustrate these general results by computational experiments. 
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Convergence to Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly is a problem that recurrently arises as a
subject of study in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equi-
librium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics and the evolutionary stability
of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been studied by several articles. Several articles show
that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. Vriend (2000) proposes
to use genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to
Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. We show in this article how social learning gives rise
to Walras equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual learning can eﬀectively yield conver-
gence to Cournot instead of Walras equilibrium. We illustrate these general results by computational
experiments.
JEL codes: L130; L200; D430; C630; C730.
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilib-
rium; Genetic algorithms.1 Introduction
Convergence to Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly is a problem that recurrently arises as a
subject of study in economics. Already in the 60’s, several articles in Review of Economic Studies
discussed the convergence under best reply (BR) dynamics (see for example Theocharis (1960). This
debate has concluded to the instability of BR dynamics as soon as there is three or more ﬁrms in the
oligopoly and this, under standard assumptions about demand and cost conditions.
The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly
connected with adjustment dynamics and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot
game has been studied by several articles. Vega-Redondo (1997) shows, for example, that the Wal-
rasian equilibrium (WE) is the unique stable ESS situation in a quantity competition game with a
homogenous product. The results of this literature strongly enhanced the doubts about the conver-
gence of adjustment dynamics to Cournot equilibrium (CE). At the core of this literature lay the
selection dynamics that are considered in the models. When one interprets these dynamics resulting
from the learning process of boundedly rational ﬁrms under incomplete and imperfect information
(about the demand function, the quantities of the competitors and their costs), the nature of this
learning becomes the central element.
Evolutionary stability concept is more naturally connected to social learning of ﬁrms, through
imitation of strategies and experimentation (random mutations) but it does not exclude other learning
schemes, as long as they can be formulated as selection mechanisms operating at the level of ﬁrm
population. Unfortunately, richer learning schemes tend to imply complex dynamics, and oligopoly
is more naturally formulated as a playing the ﬁeld game than a pairwise matching process. The
analysis of these dynamics is very diﬃcult under general conditions (see for example Stegeman and
Rhode (2004) for a partial tentative) and recent studies have focused on the consequences of speciﬁc
representations of ﬁrms’ learning, using computational experiments.
Vriend (2000) advanced that genetic algorithms (GA) can be used to demonstrate the “essential
diﬀerence between individual and social learning”. This article shows that a GA operating at the
ﬁrm population level yields convergence, under social learning, to the WE, while a set of GAs
each adjusting the strategies of an individual ﬁrm imply, under individual learning, the convergence
to the CE. The main mechanism that is proposed as the source of this contrasted result is the
spite eﬀect that ﬁrst appeared in evolutionary biology (see Hamilton (1970)). This eﬀect is already
underlined by Vega-Redondo (1997) in the explanation of the main result of this article. The spite
eﬀect corresponds to the fact that an individual can harm itself but if it even more harms others,
it can gain an evolutionary advantage. These results have recently been questioned by Arifovic and
Maaschek (forthcoming) who draw attention to the speciﬁc implementation adopted by Vriend in
terms of the mechanisms of the GA–based learning and the cost structure of ﬁrms. As a consequence,
the results on this problem are deﬁnitely puzzling and some general exploration of this question is
welcome. We propose to inquire in this article a more general analysis of the convergence to equilibria
in Cournot oligopoly.
In a ﬁrst section, we study the properties of CE and WE in terms of evolutionary stability. The
second section is dedicated to the analysis of the consequences of the spite eﬀect on the evolutionary
stability. The third section analyzes the general mechanisms that derive GA-based learning and their
consequences on the outcomes of social and individual learning. We show why social learning can
not yield convergence to CE and why individual learning can under some important conditions. The
last section concludes the article.
12 Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibria in oligopoly
2.1 A simple oligopoly model
We consider a standard symmetrical n−ﬁrms oligopoly model of quantity competition where all ﬁrms
produce a homogenous product. The inverse demand function for this good is given by p = p(Q),
where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi and dp/dQ < 0. The common cost function of the ﬁrms is C (qi), with C0 > 0
and C00 > 0. The proﬁt function of a ﬁrm is hence standard: πi(qi,...,qn) = p(Q)qi − C(qi). Since
the interaction between the strategies of the ﬁrms only takes place through the common inverse
demand function (and hence, through the sum of these quantities), a quantity proﬁle (q1,...,qn) can
be represented, from the point of view of a ﬁrm i, as (qi,Q−i), where Q−i =
P
j6=i qj.
In this oligopoly two diﬀerent kinds of equilibria can be deﬁned: the Cournot–Nash equilibrium
(CE) and the Walrasian equilibrium (WE).
Deﬁnition 1. A Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CE) is given by a quantity proﬁle qC and a market
price pC such as

















, ∀i = 1,...n (1)




Deﬁnition 2. A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is given by a quantity proﬁle qW and a market price
pW such as









= pW, ∀i = 1,...n (2)




Since dp/dQ < 0 and C
00
> 0, the conditions (1) and (2) imply the standard results on the




















As a consequence, the Cournot equilibrium is preferred by each ﬁrm and the consumer’s surplus
is maximal in the Walrasian equilibrium. The possibility that, under some selection dynamics, an
oligopoly where each individual ﬁrm is proﬁt maximizer can nevertheless converge to WE instead of
CE is hence quite a paradoxical result that explains why this debate has been continuing for such a
long time in economics. This paradoxical result is established through the analysis of the evolutionary
stability of these equilibria.
2.2 Evolutionary stability of equilibria
In standard evolutionary game theory, the selection dynamics are studied through symmetric pairwise
interactions within a large population of players. A strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
if, once adopted by the whole population, it cannot be invaded by a small mass of mutants (Maynard-
Smith (1982), Weibull (1995)). Or, following the traditional deﬁnition (Weibull 2006):









−i) ⇒ πi(qi,Q−i) < πi(q∗
i ,Q−i) (7)
It is clear that the conditions (6,7) implies that all ESS is a Nash equilibrium strategy but all
NE strategy is not necessarily ESS..
This deﬁnition, while considering random, pairwise contests between individuals drawn from a large
population, is obtained by assuming that both the predominant player (e.g. strategy) and the mutant
confront the same population proﬁle. In a ﬁnite population game, as already noticed by Riley (1978),
a strategy which satisﬁes the previous conditions (6 − 7) , may not be protected against invasion by
a mutant strategy. In order to analyze an oligopoly situation, we need, as showed by Al´ os-Ferrer
and Ania (2005), a deﬁnition of an ESS for a ﬁnite population of players which ”play the ﬁeld”, that
is all compete with each other simultaneously. Schaﬀer (1988) arrives to the same conclusion and
proposes a concept of ﬁnite population ESS which is deﬁned as follows1
Deﬁnition 4. In a ﬁnite population game, a strategy proﬁle q∗ is said to be evolutionary stable if,























In our oligopoly game, this deﬁnition means that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm i must be higher if she
faces a mutant that plays qm than if she was the mutant.
2.3 ESS and Nash equilibrium
As shown by Schaﬀer (1988), a ﬁnite population ESS is not generally a Nash equilibrium strategy.







Indeed, the meaning of condition (8) together with condition (9) is as follows: even if an individual
ﬁrm has a net beneﬁt by moving from the current equilibrium, the other ﬁrms will necessarily
imitate it, and the population cannot be invaded by the mutant strategy. As a consequence the
current equilibrium strategy is ESS.
A direct consequence of this result implies the paradox we have underlined in the preceding
paragraph:
Proposition 1. (Schaﬀer (1989), Vega-Redondo (1997)) In a ﬁnite population oligopoly game, the
only ESS is the Walrasian equilibrium strategy.
The next section will analyze the mechanisms which are behind this result.
3 Evolutionary stability of equilibria and the spite eﬀect
The mechanism which pushes the population towards the Walrasian equilibrium is well known in the
evolutionary literature:
1Sloth and Witta Jacobson (2006) deﬁne in a similar way the concept of Darwinian equilibrium.
3“[...] a ﬁrm maximising its own proﬁt may help its non-maximising competitors to do
even better. Put another way, a ﬁrm which does not maximise its proﬁt may still earn
proﬁts which are larger than those of its proﬁt-maximising competitors, if the costs to
itself of its deviation from maximisation are smaller than the costs it imposes on the
maximising competitors. [...]This result is a consequence of the Darwinian deﬁnition of
economic natural selection, whereby it is the ﬁttest ﬁrms which survive. The above result
is essentially an application to economics of Hamilton’s theory of spite in evolutionary
biology [Hamilton (1970.1971)]. An act by an animal is spiteful if the animal harms
both itself and another. Hamilton demonstrated that such a trait could be selected for
if the population was not very large. The condition for the selection of a spiteful trait is
that the decrease in an animal’s own Darwinian ﬁtness is smaller than the decrease in the
ﬁtness of the average member of the rest of the population; since the holder of the spiteful
trait thus has a higher ﬁtness than that of his intraspecies competitors, the trait will be
selected for. [...]This result is directly analogous to the spitefulness of the evolutionary
biology ESS in ﬁnite populations [...]”
Mark E. Schaﬀer (1989)
Strictly speaking, the spite eﬀect is the opposite of altruism. We should used the terms of spite
eﬀect only when the mutant ﬁrm j suﬀers from deviation (∆πj < 0) but it suﬀers less than the non
mutant ﬁrms (∆πi < ∆πj < 0,∀i 6= j). By analogy, in the positive direction, we may reinterpret
this eﬀect as the fact that the net gain of the mutant (∆πj > 0) is greater than the net gain of the
non mutant ﬁrms (∆πj > ∆πi) which is always true of course if the non mutants suﬀer from the
deviations (∆πi < 0). Thus we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. In a ﬁnite population oligopoly game, given that a ﬁrm j will deviate from an equilib-
rium strategy, a spite eﬀect exists when ∆πi − ∆πj < 0,i 6= j.
The relationship between Nash equilibrium strategy, ESS and spite eﬀect is straightforward.
3.1 Nash equilibrium and ESS in a ﬁnite population oligopoly game
Deﬁnition 6. A strategy QN = (qN
1 ,qN
2 ,...,qN




−i),∀qi 6= qN (10)
Proposition 2. In a symmetric ﬁnite population oligopoly game, a strict Nash equilibrium strategy
is an ESS if a spite eﬀect does not exists.
Proof.




−i),∀qi 6= qN (11)















<0 by inequality ( 11)
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−j) > 0,∀qj 6= qN
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−j). And, by deﬁnition of the strict Nash equilibrium, we get the second






which thus establishes the ESS condition (8). So, if the spite eﬀect does not occur, the symmetric
Nash equilibrium strategy is an ESS. 
3.1.1 One single mutation case
Proposition 3. In a ﬁnite population symmetric oligopoly game, with one possible single mutation,
a strategy proﬁle ˆ q = (ˆ q1,..., ˆ qn) is an ESS, and no spite eﬀect occurs, if
dqi
 
p0dqi + p − C0
< 0,∀i (12)
Proof.
At ˆ q the proﬁts of the ﬁrms are
πj(ˆ q) = p(ˆ q)ˆ qj − C(ˆ qj) (13)
πi(ˆ q) = p(ˆ q)ˆ qi − C(ˆ qi) (14)
A deviation of the ﬁrm j from the equilibrium, qj 6= ˆ qj, yields a new strategy proﬁle qm =
{ˆ q1, ˆ q2,.., ˆ qj−1,qj, ˆ qj+1,..., ˆ qn) and the following proﬁts:
πj(qm) = p(qm)qj − C(qj) (15)
πi(qm) = p(qm)ˆ qi − C(ˆ qi),∀i (16)
The deviation will not be imitated if, with this new strategy proﬁle qm, the mutant ﬁrm j earns a
lower proﬁt than the non mutant ﬁrms, that is if
πj(qm) − πi(qm) < 0
⇔ πj(qm) − πj(ˆ q) − πi(qm) + πi(ˆ q) < 0
⇔ ∆πi − ∆π−i < 0
since by the symmetry of the initial equilibrium we have πi(ˆ q) = πj(ˆ qi).
The net gain of ﬁrm j, ∆πj corresponds to (15) − (13):
∆πj = πj(qm) − πj(ˆ q)
= [p(qm)qi − (p(ˆ q)ˆ qi] − [C(qi) − C(ˆ qi)]
For a local deviation, qj = ˆ qj + dqj we can compute the marginal net gain:
∆πj =
h
p(ˆ qj + dqj, ˆ Q−j)(ˆ qj + dqj) − p(ˆ q)ˆ qj
i
− [Cj(ˆ qj + dqj) − Cj(ˆ qj)] (17)
=
h

















with ˆ p = p(ˆ q). For any other ﬁrm i 6= j we have:
∆πi = πi(ˆ qj + dqj, ˆ Q−j) − πi(ˆ q)
=








∆πj − ∆πi < 0 (21)
=⇒ˆ qjdp + dpdqj + ˆ pdqj − dCj − ˆ qidp < 0
=⇒dp(ˆ qj − ˆ qi) + dpdqj + ˆ pdqj − dCj < 0 (22)
=⇒dpdqj + ˆ pdqj − dCj < 0 since ˆ qj = ˆ qi (23)
Since dp = p0dqj and dCj = C0dqj,
p0dqjdqj + ˆ pdqj − C0dqj < 0 (24)
dqj
 
p0dqj + ˆ p − C0
< 0 (25)

Before discussing more in detail in the next section the implications of learning with genetic
algorithms, we can already establish a ﬁrst general result concerning social learning in the ﬁnite
oligopoly game.
Proposition 4. With imitation-based social learning, the strategies that imply a deviation from the
WE will be eliminated while the strategies that imply a deviation from the CE in the direction of the
WE can diﬀuse in the population.
Proof.
Local (inﬁnitesimal) deviation from the WE. At the WE we have ˆ p = pw = C0 and the condition for
stability (25) becomes p0(dqj)2 < 0.
• dqj < 0: Since p0 < 0, the condition (25) holds. A ﬁrm that deviates alone by decreasing its
quantity will beneﬁt, via a price increase, from a revenue increase lower that the one it will oﬀer
to the ﬁrms who stay committed. So, the mutant strategy will not be replicated by imitation
and the Walrasian strategy will persist.
• dqj > 0: The ﬁrm who increases its quantity will decrease the market price to a level such that
the proﬁt of every ﬁrm will decrease. But the loss of the mutant ﬁrm will be higher than the
loss of the ﬁrms continuing to stick to the Walrasian strategy. Thus, this mutant strategy will
again not be replicated in the population.
Local deviation from CE. Remark that at the CE we have, by deﬁnition, an equality between
marginal revenue and marginal cost. This last condition means that p0
jqCE
j + pCE − C0 = 0. If
the deviation is local, we must have |dqj| < qCE
j , then |p0dqj| < |p0qj| with p0 < 0. Therefore the
following results hold:
• dqj > 0 : Since pCE − C0 > 0, p0
jqCE
j + pCE − C0 = 0 and p0dqj < p0qCE
j (since |dqj| < qCE
j )
we necessarily have p0dqj + pCE − C0 > 0. As a consequence, the condition 12 does not hold
and a spite eﬀect is not observed. If one ﬁrm leaves the CE by increasing its quantity, it will
decrease its proﬁts but this decrease will be less than the reduction of the other ﬁrms proﬁts.
This strategy will be replicated and the deviation from CE will diﬀuse in the population.
• dqj < 0: In this case, we have p0dqj > 0 > p0qCE
j and dqj(p0dqj + pCE − C0) < 0. Thus, no one
should imitate a strategy that move away from the CE by decreasing again the quantity. That
is, if one ﬁrm decreases its quantity from CE, it will earn less supplementary proﬁts than the
other ﬁrms. As a consequence, this strategy will not be replicated in the population.

63.1.2 Generalization to m identical mutants
Identical mutants
Assume now that m ﬁrms play a strategy qj = q while the other n − m ﬁrms stay committed to
the initial equilibrium strategy q∗.





i = q∗,∀i, is a strong ESS if, ∀qj 6= q∗,
πim(qj,Q−jm) > πjm(qj,Qjm)
with Qjm ≡ (m − 1)qj + (n − m)q∗, jm any mutant ﬁrm and im any non mutant ﬁrm.
This means that if m ﬁrms plays qj 6= q∗, the proﬁts of these m ﬁrms should be lower than the
proﬁts of the n − m ﬁrms that stayed committed to q∗. From this remark, Schaﬀer (1988) deﬁnes
the concept of m − stable (ﬁnite population) ESS as follows.
Deﬁnition 8. An equilibrium strategy (q∗
1,q∗
2,..,q∗
n) is called an m-stable (ﬁnite population) ESS if
πi(Q ˆ m) > πj(Q ˆ m) and πi(Qm+1) < πj(Qm+1)
with 1 ≤ ˆ m ≤ m, and with Q ˆ m ≡ ˆ mqj + (n − ˆ m)q∗ and Qm+1 ≡ (m + 1)qi + (n − (m + 1))q∗.
The m-stable ESS means that as long as the number of the mutants is less than or equal to m
the initial equilibrium strategy is an ESS one. But if the number of mutants increases above m, this
is no more the case.




not yield a spite eﬀect for at least one ﬁrm, it is an ESS equilibrium whatever is the number of
mutants.
Proof.
With the m simultaneous mutants belonging to Im, the set of mutant ﬁrms, the proﬁts are, with
Qm = (m − 1)ˆ q + (n − m)q∗, and with qj = ˆ q,∀j ∈ Im and qi = q∗
i = q∗,∀i / ∈ Im
For any mutant ﬁrm: πj(Qm) = p(Qm)ˆ q − Ci(ˆ q) (26)
For any non mutant ﬁrm: πi(Qm) = p(Qm)q∗ − C(q∗) (27)
It is clear that the ∆πj are equivalent between all mutant ﬁrms and ∆πi, between all non mutant
ﬁrms. If the spite eﬀect holds for at least one non mutant ﬁrm then it holds for all non mutant ﬁrms.
As a consequence, the initial strategy proﬁle is an ESS. 
Corollary 1. The Walrasian equilibrium strategy is an m-stable ESS, ∀m < n − 1.
Proof.
Since the ﬁrms are identical, the oligopoly game with a n ﬁrms and with m mutants is equivalent to
a 2–players game with one single mutant. And thus, if the Walrasian equilibrium is an ESS with one
single mutant for any ﬁnite population size n, it is an m stable ESS with m identical mutants. 
Non-invadable and invading strategies
As noticed by Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2006), one can reinterpret the ESS (i.e. 1–stable ESS) and
the (n − 1)–stable ESS as, respectively, an non-invadable strategy and invading strategy.
First, if a strategy q∗ is an ESS, no matter what the mutation strategy is, the mutant will always
ﬁnd itself earning lower payoﬀs than the rest of the population. As a consequence, this mutation
should disappear. So, the (1–stable) ESS is a non-invadable strategy.
Second, if a strategy is (n − 1)–stable ESS, then, whenever the whole population but one agent
mutate to another strategy, the non-mutant player will earn larger payoﬀs than the mutants. It is
possible to reinterpret the previous result by saying that the non-mutant player was the mutant one.
Since its strategy is the best one, it will invade the rest of the population: the (n − 1)–stable ESS
becomes an invading strategy.
7Heterogeneous mutants with heterogeneous deviations
Let assume now that there exists m heterogeneous mutants. In our oligopoly game, this means
that some of the ﬁrms will increase their quantities while some others will decrease it. In such a
framework, the ﬁrms that do not move will have an evolutionary stable strategy if, at least, they can
get higher proﬁts than the best of the mutants. So, the following deﬁnition holds.
Deﬁnition 9. An equilibrium strategy (q∗
1,q∗
2,..,q∗
n) is an ESS with m heterogeneous mutants belong-
ing to im if, for ∀qj 6= q∗,j ∈ im,∀qi = q∗,and ˆ q a strategy proﬁle composed of m mutant strategies
qj and n − m equilibrium strategies q∗
πi(ˆ q) > max
j∈im
πj(ˆ q)
This deﬁnition means that whatever are the quantities that the mutants will choose, and what-
ever is the new total quantity, the non mutant ﬁrms must obtain a higher proﬁt than any mutant
ﬁrms. Otherwise, at least one mutation will be optimal to imitate and it will diﬀuse.
As observed by Schaﬀer (1989), a strategy proﬁle may be m–stable with homogeneous mutants (e.g.
mutations in the same direction) but unstable with heterogeneous mutations.
Learning process of the ﬁrms in Cournot oligopoly will generally imply simultaneous heterogenous
mutations. We now consider the consequences of these mutations in the context of the debate on
individual v.s. social learning with genetic algorithms.
3.2 Spite eﬀect and importance of relative payoﬀs
As observed by Schaﬀer (1989), there is a relationship between the ﬁnite population ESS concept
and the ”beat the average” game. Obviously, a strategy is an ESS if it is not possible to increase its
relative payoﬀ by individual mutation, which means that it is a Nash equilibrium of the ”beat the
average” game reformulation of the initial oligopoly game.
Let deﬁne the function of a ﬁrm i by the diﬀerence of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and the population average
proﬁt:
πR











π−i, with π−i =
(n − 1)
n
π, with πj(qj,Q−j) = π ∀j 6= i.
Proposition 6. If q∗ is not ESS, than there exists at least one mutant strategy ˆ qj such that the
relative proﬁts of the mutant ﬁrms is increasing.
Proof.
We know that q∗ is not an (symmetrical) ESS if
πj(ˆ qj,Q∗
−j) − πi(ˆ qj,Q∗
−j) > 0

















j (ˆ qj,Q−j) > 0
2For a non homogenous initial situation, the proposition can be trivially proved by considering a deviation consisting
in the imitation of the best strategy.
8That is the new relative proﬁts is positive. Since we start from an initial equilibrium where initially
πR(q∗
j,Q∗
−j) = 0, the relative proﬁt of the mutant ﬁrm does increase. 
Another implication of this proposition can be formulated using the ﬁtness concept that we will











k6=i πj(qi,Q−i). The ﬁtness measure is used in most biology evolution game as the
base of the selection process in a given population.
Corollary 2. If q∗ is not an ESS, there exists at least one strategy ˆ qi such that the ﬁtness of the
ﬁrm is increasing.
Proof.








πj(ˆ qj,Q−j)(n − 1) − (n − 1)π > 0
nπj(ˆ qj,Q−j) > πj(ˆ qj,Q−j) + Π−i
πj(ˆ qj,Q−j)














Then the ﬁtness of the mutant ﬁrm increases. 
3.2.1 ESS, variation of proﬁts and spite eﬀect
The ESS is hence related to the variation of the relative proﬁts, but it can also formulated in terms
of variation of proﬁts. Let ∆πj = πj(ˆ qj,Q∗
−j) − πj(q∗
j,Q∗
−j) be the net evolution of the proﬁt of the
mutant ﬁrm j who decides to produce a quantity ˆ qj rather than an equilibrium quantity q∗
j. For








−j) in a symmetrical equilibrium, the following deﬁnition
is directly related to deﬁnition 4.




n} is said to be evolu-
tionary stable if, for any strategy ˆ qj 6= q∗
j,
∆πi − ∆πj ≥ 0
This means that the net gain (or loss if ∆πj < 0) of the mutant ﬁrm must be lower (greater)
than the net gain (or loss if ∆πi < 0) of the non mutant ﬁrms. The situation where the variation of




(1) initialize P (t)
(2) evaluate P (t)
while (not termination–condition) do
begin
t ← t + 1
(3) select P (t)from P (t − 1)
(4) alter P (t)
(5) evaluate P (t)
end
end
Figure 1: The structure of an evolutionary program (Michalewicz, 1996)
4 Learning, selection and convergence to equilibria
If we allow ﬁrms to adapt their production levels as a consequence of learning, this adaptation will
imply a speciﬁc selection mechanism in the evolution of their strategies. The recent debate on the
convergence to CE with learning ﬁrms (see Vriend (2000), Arifovic and Maaschek (forthcoming)) has
focused on learning with genetic algorithms (GA).
A GA is based on mechanisms inspired by biological evolution: selection, crossover and mutation
(see Figure 1). The canonical genetic algorithm makes evolve a population of chromosomes. The
size of the population m is given. It is the source of one of the strengths of the GA: implicit
parallelism (the exploration of the solution space using several candidates in parallel). The population
of chromosomes at step t (a generation) is denoted P(t) = {Aj}t with #P(t) = m, and ∀t = 1,2...T
with T the given total number of generations. Notice that T is the other source of the strengths of
the GA. The algorithm (randomly) generates an initial population P (0) of candidate chromosomes
which are evaluated at each period using the ﬁtness (value) function. They are used for composing a
new population at the next period P(t + 1). Each chromosome has a probability of being selected
that is increasing in its ﬁtness. The members included in the new population are recombined using a
crossover mechanism (see Figure ??). The crossover operation introduces controlled innovations in
the population since it combines the candidates already selected in order to invent new candidates
with a potentially better ﬁtness. Moreover, the mutation operator randomly modiﬁes the candidates
and introduces some random experimenting in order to more extensively explore the state space and
escape local optima. Typically, the probability of mutation is rather low in comparison with the
probability of crossover because otherwise the disruption introduced by excessive mutations can
destruct the hill-climbing capacity of the population. Finally, an elitism operator can be used which
ensures that the best individual of a population will be carried to the next generation.
The GA is used to represent the learning capacity of the ﬁrms, since it can make evolve a
population of production levels on the base of a ﬁtness based on the proﬁts resulting from these
quantities. Vriend (2000) confronts two diﬀerent implementations of this approach and claims that
this confrontation can prove an essential diﬀerence between social and individual learning. In the case
of social learning, the population of strategies that evolve through GA contains one strategy by ﬁrm
and the operations of the GA correspond to the imitation between ﬁrms (crossover) and to random
experimenting by some ﬁrms (mutations). In the case of individual learning, the GA operates on
the individual strategy population of each ﬁrm (we have as many GAs as ﬁrms in the economy) and
the operations of the GA correspond to recombination of strategies already found (crossover) and
random experimenting in the strategy population of the ﬁrm (mutation).
By confronting these two diﬀerent approaches to learning by GA, Vriend (2000) obtains a conver-
10gence to WE under social learning and to CE, under individual learning. Arifovic and Maaschek (forth-
coming) question these results. Our preceding discussion would indicate that the results of Vriend (2000)
are robust even if they are obtained in this article under very speciﬁc demand and cost conditions,
and with a very speciﬁc application of the GA methodology. We will now explore the general mech-
anisms that lay behind these diﬀerent results in the literature. Our analysis will be focused on the
main operator in the evolution of the population: the ﬁtness based selection. This focalization will
also allow us to connect the results on learning with the general results we have obtained in the
preceding sections.
In any population of strategies, the convergence to WE will occur in general if the selection
mechanism favours strategies with higher quantities when the market outcome is below the WE
and the strategies with lower quantities when the market is above the WE. Since the selection is
based on the relative ﬁtness of the strategies (whatever is the particular deﬁnition of this ﬁtness),
this condition is equivalent to a necessarily increasing relationship between the relative ﬁtness of the
strategies and quantities below the WE and a decreasing relationship above the WE.
Deﬁnition 11. If we note by Fj the ﬁtness of a strategy in the population of strategies, its relative





In the context of the oligopoly, we will in general have a ﬁtness function that will be positively





. In the simplest case, and the articles we cite use this
formulation, the proﬁt will directly correspond to the ﬁtness of the strategy. As a consequence, if
the share of a strategy j in the population is noted by λj, the population of strategies will only be





> 0 if qj ≤ qW
< 0 if qj > qW
0 if qj = qW
In the case of the standard genetic algorithm, the selection operates through a roulette wheel process
where the probability of reproduction of a strategy in the population is given by its relative ﬁtness.
In the case of the oligopoly, this ﬁtness is related to the proﬁts of the ﬁrms and the way these proﬁts
are compared is an essential diﬀerence between social and individual learning.
4.1 Social learning
In the case of the social learning, each strategy is played by a speciﬁc ﬁrm and the probability of
the survival of a strategy results from the comparison of the proﬁt of the ﬁrm that uses this strategy





when ﬁrm i is the user of the strategy j. If we note Π−i ≡
P




























(Π−i + πi)2 (29)
































⇔ επi,qi > εΠ−i,qi (31)
where εy,x represents the elasticity of y with x. As a consequence, the tendency towards the WE
equilibrium will depend in this case on the comparison of the impact of the quantity increase of the
ﬁrm on its proﬁt with the same impact on the total proﬁts of its competitors. If the these impacts
are positive, the increase of the quantity of the ﬁrm i will increase its probability to survive, if and
only if, the impact on its own proﬁt is greater than the impact of the other ﬁrms total proﬁt. If these
impacts are negative on the contrary, this condition is of course directly related to the spite eﬀect:
A ﬁrm that will move from a CE quantity may decrease its proﬁt (ε(Πi,qi) < 0) but it will even more
decrease the competitors proﬁts ( 0 > ε(Πi,qi) > ε(Π−i,qi)) and it will increase its relative ﬁtness. We
must distinguish two cases in the evaluation of these impacts.
4.1.1 Inﬁnite population of ﬁrms
When the population of the ﬁrms is large, we have, by the atomistic property, that the variation
of the quantity of one particular ﬁrm i does not signiﬁcantly modify neither the market price nor
the proﬁts of the competitors: ∂p(qi,Q−i)/∂qi = 0 and ∂Π−i/∂qi = 0. This of course considerably
simpliﬁes the evaluation of the terms of the equation (31):























> 0 if qi ≤ qW
< 0 if qi > qW
= 0 if qi = qW
since qW is the Walrasian strategy and it veriﬁes, by deﬁnition, p − C0 = 0. We hence observe that
increasing quantities will diﬀuse in the population when the actual outcome is below the WE and
their ﬁtness will play against their reproduction when the industry is above of this equilibrium. This
is the main mechanism that pushes the industry towards the WE instead of the CE.
124.1.2 Finite population of ﬁrms
In a ﬁnite population, the atomistic property is not assured. As a consequence, we can have


























since dCj/dqi = 0 and ∂p/∂qi = ∂p/∂Q × ∂Q/∂qi = ∂p/∂Q = p
0





qi + p − C0






















The ﬁrst term shows that the impact of an increase of its quantity depends on the position of the
ﬁrm in terms of marginal cost and price (in a similar way to the inﬁnite population case). But it
also depends, in a more complicated way, on the relative quantities and proﬁts of the ﬁrms, in a
way not disconnected from the spite eﬀect. We can note that the last eﬀect in this equation can be
reformulated:
qiΠ−i − Q−iπi = qiΠ−i + qiπi − qiπi − Q−iπi















since p0 < 0. Hence, when Π > 0, this eﬀect will favour increasing quantities if the market share of












≤ 0 iff πi < 0,qC
i < qi < qW
= 0 iff qi = qW
since p
0
qi + p − C0 < 0 in equation (33) if qC
i < qi, and p = C0, qi/Q = πi/Π if qi = qW,∀i.
As a consequence, the strategies will advance towards the WE if the ﬁrms can obtain positive
proﬁts at the neighborhood of WE.
4.2 Individual learning
When the learning of the ﬁrms is individual, the ﬁrms can not count on their interactions on the
market for directly learning the strategies from the competitors (imitation). Each ﬁrm must extract
information on the relevance of its actual strategy from the global market variables that result from
the interactions of the ﬁrms (mainly, the market price) that it can observe, and from the proﬁt it
obtains with its strategy under these market conditions.
13As a consequence, when the learning dynamics are not based on imitation, the spite eﬀect cannot
directly play. The main question again is the consequences of these dynamics in terms of convergence
to equilibrium. Since convergence to WE with social learning is general, the capability of such a
learning to allow the emergence of a CE becomes the main controversial point in this approach. This
capability will strongly depend on the kind of information on which the ﬁrm can count during its
learning process.
As Al´ os-Ferrer (2005) summarizes it: ”The intuition is that if ﬁrms remember past proﬁts, desta-
bilizing Cournot will not be such an easy task. After a single mutation [...], the mutant may earn more
than the nonmutants, but the largest proﬁt remembered will still be that of the Cournot equilibrium,
and hence, the mutant will ’correct the mistake’, even in absence of any strategic considerations.”
Riechmann(2006), on the other hand, suggests that ”if agents do not know or simply neglect the
state dependent nature of the problem, i.e. the fact that they do have an inﬂuence on the market
price, the outcome of individual learning will be the Walras equilibrium. The reason for this is
straightforward: If agents do not think or do not know they can inﬂuence the market price, the best
thing they can do is to compute a best response to last period’s equilibrium price”.
In this context, the learning of the agents is based on the comparison of performances of diﬀerent
strategies inside each ﬁrm, while the competition will imply an interaction at the market level between
the selected strategies in each period. As a consequence, the concepts of convergence and stability
become more intricate. A quantity proﬁle q∗ will only be stable at the market level if and only if
every ﬁrm plays (selects) the corresponding equilibrium strategy and if the learning process of the
ﬁrm has eﬀectively converged to this strategy.
Models of individual learning necessarily introduce dynamics for the evolution of the individual
strategies. In the discussion above we have deliberately focused on a population based approach,
in line with the recent literature on this debate. Eﬀectively, Vriend (2000), Arifovic and Maaschek
(forthcoming), and other articles, discuss the convergence problem with a representation of strategy
evolution based on diﬀerent formulations with genetic algorithms. Two contrasted approaches have
been used in this formulation: learning with proﬁt expectations based on the actual market price
used for evaluating (through hypothetical proﬁts) the population of strategies in each period, and
learning without expectations, evaluating one strategy in each period. Other intermediate cases have
also been considered, like in Vriend (2000) where the GA does not intervene in each period. When
this is relevant, we will also point to more traditional learning schemes based on best replies.
4.2.1 Individual learning with hypothetical proﬁts
In this case, ﬁrms use expectations based on the last period price for evaluating the ﬁtness of each
strategy in their population. This hypothetical proﬁt determines the relative ﬁtness of each strategy
and guides the selection process. The main algorithm of this game can be summarized as a simple
pseudocode if the oligopoly game has a duration of T periods (see Figure 2).
Notice that each strategy is evaluated, in each period t, using a same given price pt−1. Thus,
















14• Period 0: a population of k strategies, qij ∈ q0
i , is drawn for each player i.
• Period 1: each player plays (random choice) a particular strategy qij ∈ q0
i .
The corresponding market price , p1, is calculated.
• While Period ≤ T :
– The hypothetical proﬁt of each strategy qij ∈ q
t−1
i is calculated with
this price:
πij(qij,p1) = pt−1qij − C (qij), for all i.
– Using GA procedures (selection, crossover and mutation) in each strat-
egy population, a new population of strategies qt
i is deﬁned for each
ﬁrm on the base of these proﬁts.
– Again the hypothetical proﬁts are calculated
{πi1(qi1,pt−1),...,πik(qik,pt−1)}.
– From this set, one (possibly the best) strategy is drawn in order to be
played: qt
ij
– The new market price ; pt is calculated.
Figure 2: Pseudocode of the learning model with hypothetical proﬁts





























> 0 if pt−1 > C0
< if pt−1 < C0
= 0 if pt−1 = C0
with Πi =
Pk
l=1 πi(qi,l,pt−1) and if Πij > 0.








• During the roulette wheel procedure of the GA, given a price p:
– higher quantities will spread in the population, as long as p > C
0
;
– lower quantities will diﬀuse if p < C
0
.
• The strategy that will be played will be the closest one to the competitive quantity if the selec-
tion of the strategy to play is based on maximal possible ﬁtness: qj such that j ∈ maxqil fil,∀l.
As we already shown above there is a strong relationship between evolution of the ﬁtness and
ESS.
Proposition 7. Under hypothetical individual learning, the CE is not evolutionarily stable, while the
WE is.
15Proof.






n }. In this case, the learning of player i is identical to the learning of
its monopolistic optimal quantity, given that it doesn’t know the exact price relationship p(qi,QC
−i).
The hypothetical learning procedure leads to an evaluation of the proﬁt at period t that is based
on the previous price pt−1 : πi,t(qij,pt−1) = pt−1qij − C(qij). It is straightforward to see that the
ﬁtness evolution, as a maximization of the hypothetical proﬁt, will lead to the Walrasian condition:
pt−1 = C
0
. As a consequence, the CE equilibrium is not ESS, while the WE is. 









Figure 3: Convergence to WE price with hypothetical learning
We use computational experiments to illustrate our results in this section and the following
one. The details of the simulation protocol are given in Appendix A. The Figure 3 clearly shows
the market price quickly converges to WE price in all simulations of a standard oligopoly with
hypothetical proﬁts.
• Period 0: a set of k strategies, qij ∈ q0
i , is (randomly) drawn for each player
i.
• While Period ≤ T :
– If (Period (mod τ) = 0): Using GA procedures, as roulette wheel se-
lection, a new set of strategies, q
φ
i , is deﬁned for each ﬁrm.
– Each player plays a strategy qij ∈ q
φ
i . The corresponding price market,
pt, is calculated. The realized proﬁt is calculated (πi,t(Qt,pt)).
Figure 4: Pseudocode of learning model without expectations
4.2.2 Individual learning without expectations
In this approach, the ﬁrm must play strategies in order to evaluate their relative ﬁtness. Each
population of strategies is played without modiﬁcation during τ periods (an epoch corresponding to
the GArate in Vriend (2000)). A special case would be an epoch of k periods where each strategy
is played once, following a sequential order, but one can consider more sophisticated conﬁgurations.
During an epoch, strategies from given populations meet following the strategy-selection scheme used
(random, roulette wheel, play the best, etc.). Proﬁts of strategies are computed as a consequence
16of this matching process and, at the end of the epoch, the GA modiﬁes populations on the base of
these proﬁts. Figure 4 gives the pseudocode of this conﬁguration.
This learning algorithm diﬀers from the hypothetical proﬁt case by one important aspect. Each
strategy is evaluated based on the base of the real observed proﬁt that it yields by repeatedly
meeting the strategies of other ﬁrms. This observed proﬁt is necessarily based on the eﬀective price
corresponding to these strategies and it can now include information on the demand curve if the same
population of quantities can meet diﬀerent, but given, quantities of the competitors. This obviously
will possible if the GArate is long enough in comparison with the strategy population size.
Given a GArate, each individual strategy of the ﬁrm qij will play GArate times against the
strategy populations of other ﬁrms {qlj}l=1...n,l6=g. On average, the proﬁt of this strategy will be
given by















where f (qlj|GArate) is the frequency of each individual strategy of other ﬁrms, conditioned by the
strategy selection process (the selection of the strategies to be played on the market) and GArate.
We can observe that
GArate → ∞ ⇒ f (qlj|GArate) → f (qlj)
which is the real empirical frequency of each strategy in the strategy population of the ﬁrm l.
Moreover, given the populations of other ﬁrms, the average proﬁt of qij that results from the matching
process now implies ∂p/∂qij < 0 and the selection process will be able to use this information on
the demand curve. As a consequence, the strategies that correspond to C0 = p will be dominated
by strategies that are closer to the condition C0 = p+qij∂p/∂qij < p. This mechanism will push the
strategies towards CE instead of WE.
Again we use computational experiments to illustrate these results. We gives results on conver-
gence conditioned by two main dimensions that arose in the preceding discussion: the GArate and
the mechanism that is used to select in the population the strategy to be played on the market (see
Appendix A). The results of our simulations (a batch of 25 simulations with each conﬁguration) are
given in Figure 5. In each simulation we run exactly 300 generations for the GA.
Graphics (a1 − c1) and (a2 − c2) show that if the strategies do not meet enough frequently, the
information on demand is quite diﬃcult to extract and ﬁrms have some diﬃculty to converge to
CE price, whatever the selection mechanism used for choosing the played quantities. This eﬀect is
stronger for the random selection (RS) process since the matching of the strategies is not oriented at
all in this case. We observe that other mechanisms already fair quite well for GArate = 10.
Graphics (a3 − c3) and (a4 − c4) show that matching mechanisms integrating some intrinsic ran-
domness (in complement of the randomness implied by the GA – mutations) give rise to convergence
to CE price when GArate is higher. The PTB mechanism that systematically plays for each ﬁrm
its supposedly best strategy of the period has some diﬃculty to converge and it has a tendency to
over-shoot by over estimating the strength of dp/dqij and hence by over reducing the production of
ﬁrms. We also observe in graphics (a3 − b3) and (a4 − b4) that random selection secures an earlier
convergence to CE by more systematically extracting information on demand, in accordance with
the general result we have established above.
These results show that one does not need very speciﬁc Cournot oligopoly game and GA setup
in order to show the convergence to CE in the case of individual learning. A simple quadratic cost
oligopoly game and an elementary, real value based, GA with only selection and low mutation is
suﬃcient to observe this convergence.
17(a1) GArate = 1, RS (a2) GArate = 10, RS (a3) GArate = 50, RS (a4) GArate = 100, RS
(b1) GArate = 1, RWS (b2) GArate = 10, RWS (b3) GArate = 50, RWS (b4) GArate = 100, RWS
(c1) GArate = 1, PTB (c2) GArate = 10, PTB (c3) GArate = 50, PTB (c4) GArate = 100, PTB
RS : Random selection; RWS : Roulette wheel selection; PTB : Play the best
Figure 5: Convergence to the Cournot equilibrium price: Individual learning without expectations
185 Conclusion
The main objective of this article is to gain some general understanding of the convergence to
equilibria in an oligopoly game with learning dynamics. We have established the properties, in terms
of evolutionary stability, of two types of potential equilibria in this game: Cournot equilibrium (CE)
and Walrasian equilibrium (WE). The ﬁrst part of the particle shows that the WE is quite robustly
stable under general conditions when learning is based on imitation and random experimenting
(mutations). This result stems from the spite eﬀect that appears when learning is possess such a
social dimension (like under imitation) and when dynamics are based on selection, hence on relative
performance of ﬁrms. Under the spite eﬀect, learning through imitation and mutation diverts the
attention of ﬁrms from their own proﬁts and prevents the emergence of dynamics based on best reply
in order to assure the evolutionary stability of the CE. The WE becomes the only ESS equilibrium
in this case. As a consequence, we study the possibility of multiple mutations, since this is more in
accordance with the playing the ﬁeld aspect of the Cournot game (each ﬁrm meets in each period
the totality of other ﬁrms and not a single, randomly drawn competitor). We show in this case that
dynamics and stability are very diﬃcult to analyze under general conditions. The second part of
the article hence focalizes a special setup for learning dynamics based on the properties of Genetic
Algorithms (GA) because this setup has yielded some puzzling results and controversies about the
convergence to CE. We ﬁrst study the general conditions under which the selection in GA can
promote convergence to CE. We show that when the GA represents social learning, the convergence
can only occur to WE. In the case of individual learning, the convergence to CE is only possible if
the interactions of the ﬁrms allow them to discover the decreasing relationship between the market
price and their quantities. We show that this is not possible with learning based on hypothetical
proﬁts (as considered by Arifovic in several articles and in the forthcoming paper, in collaboration
with Maaschek). Some memory of quantities associated to observed current proﬁts is necessary in
order to secure this convergence. We show, in a computational setup close to Vriend (2000), but
under quite general cost and GA conditions, that the convergence to CE arises when ﬁrms’ strategies
have enough opportunity to meet each other before the intervention of the GA. Our results conﬁrm
and clarify the results obtained in Vriend (2000).
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A.1 Oligopoly model of the experiments
Let deﬁne a simple general oligopoly game with
P(qi,Q−i) = a − b(qi + Q−i), a,b > 0
Ci(qi) = P(qi,Q−i)qi − (F + cqi + dq2
i )




For the n ﬁrms oligopoly, the equilibria are given as follows (with Q−i = (n − 1)q−i):
Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CE): qC
i =
a − c
b + 2d + bn






In our simulations we use the following numerical speciﬁcation for the oligopoly:
a = 256,b = 1,F = 0,c = 56,d = 1,n = 20.
CE: qC
i = 200/23 = 8.6957, pC = 1888/23 = 82.087
WE: qW
i = 100/11 = 9.0909, pW = 816/11 = 74.1818182
B GA and other speciﬁcations
In all simulations we have used the same genetic algorithm (GA): a real value based GA with 20 chromosomes.
We have kept the number of generations constant over all simulations in order to let other parameters determine
the learning capacity of the ﬁrms. In order to keep a GA structure as close as possible to our theoretical results,
we used a GA only based on selection (roulette wheel selection) and mutations (with a uniform rate of one
mutation in each run of the GA, for each ﬁrm).
The chromosomes of ﬁrst generation for each ﬁrm are randomly generated in the interval

(1 − γ)qC,(1 + γ)qW
,
with γ = 1%. In the case of the learning without expectations (LWE, epoch based learning), we have randomly
generated the proﬁts corresponding to this ﬁrst generation in the interval [0,10].
Mutations introduce new strategies in the population and they are Gaussian, centered around the individual
strategy population average
ˆ qij = ¯ qi + σℵ(0,1)
with initial proﬁts drawn using the same structure for the LWE case
ˆ πij = ¯ πi + σℵ(0,1).
We use σ = 5% for the LWE case and σ = 1% in the learning with hypothetical proﬁts case (LHP).
We have used the following scaled ﬁtness functions for our experiments:
















i is the maximal proﬁt in the individual population of strategies.
In the learning without expectations case, three strategy selection mechanisms have been tested:
• Random selection (RS): a strategy is uniformly selected in the population to be played on the market;
• Roulette wheel selection (RWS): the probability of selection of a strategy is proportional to its relative
ﬁtness, fij = Fij/
P
Fij;
21• Play the best selection (PTB): the strategy with the highest relative ﬁtness is played.
In this case, the populations of strategies are played without the intervention of the GA for a given number of
periods (GArate in Vriend (2000). We test the following cases for the GArate: {1,20,50,100}. The last case
corresponds the assumption used by Vriend.
In the LWHP case, only the best strategy is played in accordance with Arifovic and Maaschek (forthcoming).
We run 25 simulations with each conﬁguration and the graphics give the averages over ﬁrms for these 25 simula-
tions, as in Vriend (2000) and Arifovic and Maaschek (forthcoming).
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